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NONTESTIMONIAL DECLARATIONS
AGAINST PENAL INTEREST: ESCHEWING
THE CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT
FOR INCULPATORY STATEMENTS AFTER
CRA WFORD
MICHAEL DUFFY*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment 1 and the many hearsay exceptions codified in
American law has evolved substantially over time. Courts have
struggled to define the precise boundaries of the relationship, in
particular, the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. Recently, the
Supreme Court redrew these boundaries between a defendant's
Sixth Amendment protections and the various hearsay exceptions
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The lower courts must now
apply these hearsay exceptions in a manner comporting with the
standards of the nation's highest court.
Reshaping the approach to confrontation issues has had a
direct impact on the declaration against penal interest exception
to the hearsay rule. This exception will undoubtedly be the
subject of many criminal cases that require an analysis of the
Court's newly minted Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
Previously, the Court has chosen not to decide certain issues
regarding this particular exception, permitting conflicting
standards among the circuit courts to exist. Recent decisions by
the Court, however, provide new answers to old questions. The
uncertainty over unresolved issues, such as those left undecided by
the Court in Williamson v. United States,2 should no longer be
3
problematic for the lower courts.
Michael B. Duffy, J.D., January 2008, The John Marshall Law School.
The author thanks Dean Ralph Ruebner for his invaluable help in the
conception of this comment topic, as well as his constant assistance
throughout the writing process.
1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
3. See id. at 605 (leaving open the questions of whether the statement
against interest exception is firmly rooted and whether corroborating
circumstances are required to admit inculpatory statements against the
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This Comment argues that courts should apply the
particularized
guarantees
of
trustworthiness
test
to
nontestimonial statements against penal interest. Part II of this
Comment outlines the relationship between the statements
against penal interest exception and the Confrontation Clause.
Part III-A analyzes the corroboration requirement for statements
against interest that inculpate the accused. Part III-B discusses
how Crawford v. Washington4 has led courts to implicitly reject the
corroboration requirement for nontestimonial statements in favor
of the test outlined in Ohio v. Roberts.5 Finally, Part IV proposes
that the correct approach for analyzing nontestimonial inculpatory
statements is to determine whether the statement bears
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness - namely, the second
part of the Roberts test.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3): Statements Against Interest
Hearsay is defined as any out of court statement offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 6 If a statement is in fact
hearsay, it is inadmissible as evidence, unless it falls under one of
the many exceptions.7 One exception recognized at common law,
as well as under the Federal Rules of Evidence, is the statements
against interest exception. 8
In order to satifsy the statements against interest hearsay
exception, the Federal Rules require that the declarant be
unavailable 9 and that the declarant's statement be:
accused under the declarations against interest hearsay exception).
4. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
5. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
6. FED. R. EVID. 801.
7. FED. R. EVID. 802.

8. Keith Miles Aurzada, Case Note, Evidence, FRE 804(b)(3): The
Williamson Decision EstablishesA Bright-Line Rule That Invites Injustice and
Cripples The Hearsay Exception For Statements Against Penal Interest.
Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994), 30 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 591, 595 (1995). In 1844, the House of Lords, in the Sussex Peerage Case,
held that the defendant could not offer evidence of a confession to the crime
made by another person who was unavailable to testify. Id. The Sussex
Peerage Case limited the admissibility of statements against interest to
situations where the interest was proprietary or pecuniary. Id. The American
courts followed this line of reasoning in order to prevent the admission of
fabricated self-inculpatory statements made in order to exculpate the accused.
Id. Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion in Donnelly v. United States,
expressed doubt regarding the indiscriminate rejection of all such evidence.
228 U.S. 243, 277 (1913). In 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of
Evidence and codified the "against interest" exception in the United States
Federal Courts. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
9. FED. R. EVID. 804(b); see also FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (defining situations
in which a declarant would be unavailable).
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A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to
the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable
person in the declarant's position would not have made the
statement unless the declarant believed it to be true.' 0
On its face, the rule is equally applicable to criminal and civil
cases. In criminal cases, however, declarations against penal
interest must also satisfy the second sentence of 804(b)(3). That
sentence requires that "[a] statement tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused
is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."'"
Thus, to come under the exception, three elements must be
satisfied. First, the declarant must be unavailable. Second, the
statement must subject the declarant to criminal liability that a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made
unless the declarant believed it to be true. Finally, if offered to
exculpate the accused, the statement must be corroborated by
1 2
circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness.
The third element is per se limited to only those statements,
presumably offered by the accused, that would exculpate the
accused. This element leaves open the question of what additional
requirements are necessary to admit a statement which inculpates
the accused.1 3 The immediate answer to this question is that the
14
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment must be satisfied.
Courts struggled with this issue and reached different
conclusions as to what the appropriate standard should be for
Some courts
admitting statements inculpating the accused.
decided to require corroboration for both exculpatory and
inculpatory statements, 5 while others chose not to answer the
10. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
11. Id.
12. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 699 (5th Cir. 1978).
13. See id. at 700 (noting that no express provision safeguards declarations
against a defendant).
14. See id. (recognizing that the central underpinning safeguard for
inculpatory statements admitted against the defendant must be the
Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution).
15. See id. at 701 (holding that the admissibility of inculpatory declarations
against interest requires corroborating circumstances that "clearly indicate
the trustworthiness of the statement"); United States v. Taggart, 944 F.2d
837, 840 (11th Cir. 1991) (following the holding of Alvarez); United States v.
Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1383 (8th Cir. 1981) (approving, in general, the threepronged test for admissibility of inculpatory declarations against interest
developed in Alvarez); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1170 (2d
Cir. 1989) (requiring corroborating circumstances even when the statement is
offered to inculpate the accused); Am. Auto. Accessories, Inc. v. Fishman, 175
F.3d 534, 541 (7th Cir. 1999) (choosing to utilize a unitary standard for
applying Rule 804(b)(3) to statements offered both to exculpate and to
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16

B. The ConfrontationClause of the Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment requires that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...to be confronted
with the witnesses against him .. ."17 Mattox v. United States 5 is
the foundation for modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 19
The Court in Mattox held, as a general rule, that witnesses who
accuse the defendant of wrongdoing must appear in court to offer
testimony and be cross-examined in order to satisfy the clause. 20
The Supreme Court refined the application and meaning of the
Sixth Amendment in a series of cases decided between 1965 and
1972;21 however, the test enunciated in Ohio v. Roberts22 provided
inculpate a defendant); see also United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1300
(1st Cir. 1997) (finding that even though the court has not expressly extended
the corroboration requirement to statements that inculpate the accused, it has
applied the rule as if corroboration were required for such statements); United
States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 1981)(Adams, J., concurring
opinion) (agreeing with the majority opinion that 804(b)(3) can be used to
admit inculpatory statements against the accused but only when it is
demonstrated that "corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement"). But see Harrison v. Chandler, NO. 975511 / 97-5544, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27744, at **20-21 (6th Cir. Oct. 26,
1998) (refusing to apply the corroboration requirement to an inculpatory
statement admitted by the government in an unpublished opinion in which
the issue was not briefed).
16. United States v. Williams, 989 F.2d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting
that the Ninth Circuit had yet to resolve whether the rule requiring
corroborating evidence applies to inculpatory statements).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In Pointer v. Texas, the Supreme Court held
that "the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses
against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment." 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
18. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
19. Thomas J. Reed, Crawford v. Washington and the Irretrievable
Breakdown of a Union: Separating the Confrontation Clause from the Hearsay
Rule, 56 S.C. L. REV. 185, 192 (2004).
20. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243. In Mattox, two witnesses who previously
testified against the defendant during Mattox's first trial died before the
second trial. Id. at 240. Even though Mattox cross-examined the witnesses at
the first trial, he argued that he had been denied his right to confront the
witnesses against him. Id. at 240-44. The Court rejected this argument
holding that the Framers did not intend rigid construction of basic
constitutional rights. Id. The Court found that while the clause was primarily
designed to protect criminal defendants from being tried on depositions and ex
parte affidavits, there are some situations which warrant the admission of
certain statements from unavailable witnesses, despite the defendant's
constitutional right. Id. The general rule "must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case." Id. at 243.
21. See, e.g., Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (holding that the
admission of an accomplice's statement violated the Confrontation Clause
because the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant in
order to determine if the statement was made and if it was true); Pointer, 380
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a more definitive outline.
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court established the framework for
analyzing hearsay under the Confrontation Clause. The Court
was called upon to consider once again the relationship between
the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule with its many
exceptions. 23
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
reiterated the Court's position that a literal and rigid
interpretation of the clause would "abrogate virtually every
hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too
extreme. '24 The majority, however, found that the clause was
25
intended to exclude some hearsay.
The Court decided that a judicial determination of reliability
could substitute for actual confrontation in the form of crossexamination. 26 The majority determined that the statements of
unavailable declarants were admissible so long as they bore
adequate indicia of reliability.27 The Roberts reliability test is
satisfied if the hearsay statement: 1) falls under a firmly rooted
hearsay exception; or 2) if the statement bears particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness such that adversarial testing would
be expected to add little, if anything, to the statement's

U.S. at 404 (stating that "the decisions of this Court and other courts
throughout the years have constantly emphasized the necessity for crossexamination as a protection for defendants in criminal cases."). In Pointer,the
defendant was not represented by counsel at his preliminary hearing when the
State called Phillips as a witness. Id. at 401-02. Phillips identified Pointer as
the man who robbed him at gunpoint. Id. The State introduced the transcript
of Phillips's testimony at trial because he was unavailable. Id. Justice Black,
writing for the Court, concluded that Pointer did not confront his accuser
because he was denied the right to counsel at the hearing. Id. at 406-07; see
also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968) (determining that
confessions by accomplices and codefendants are unreliable unless they are
tested by cross-examination). The Bruton Court was concerned that admitting
an accomplice's confession without corroborating evidence would be harmful
and violative of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 136-37. See generally
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 159 (1970) (reasoning that the
Confrontation Clause mandates only that an opportunity to cross examine be
given, rejecting the notion that the clause requires an effective crossexamination); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972) (concluding that
the defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses at
his first trial and no Confrontation Clause violation occurred when the
transcript of the witness's testimony was admitted at the second trial).
22. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (holding that statements by unavailable
declarants are only admissible when the statement bears "adequate indicia of
reliability").
23. Id. at 62. Justice Blackmun noted that the many hearsay exceptions
resemble "an old-fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of
paintings by cubists, futurists and surrealists." Id.

24. Id. at 63.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 66.
27. Id.
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C. The Supreme Court's Decision in Williamson

In Williamson, the Court narrowed the scope of Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b)(3) and held that only the individual portions of
such statements that are against the declarant's interest are
admissible. 29 In other words, the rule does not allow the
admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are
made within a broader narrative that is generally self30
inculpatory.
In Williamson, the defendant, Fredel Williamson, appealed
his conviction on the grounds that the admission of his
accomplice's confession violated Rule 804(b)(3) and the
Confrontation Clause. 31 Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor
opined that the statement against penal interest exception
protects against the traditional risks of admitting hearsay because
people do not subject themselves to criminal liability unless they
believe the statements are true. 32 The exception, nonetheless,
leaves open the possibility that an accomplice may make falseinculpatory statements to shift blame to the defendant. 33
Therefore, the Court concluded that the rule should be
interpreted narrowly to allow only those declarations or remarks
within the confession that are individually self-inculpatory. 34 The
case was remanded by the Court to determine which statements in

28. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124-25 (1999) (plurality opinion) (citing
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).

29. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599. Justice Kennedy concurred in judgment
but argued in his opinion for a broader reading of Rule 804(b)(3). Id. at 611.
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, Justice Kennedy
argued that the rule can be read as expressing a policy that collateral
statements are admissible. Id. at 612. Kennedy based this proposition on the
fact that since 804(b)(3) is silent on the issue of collateral statements, the
Court should determine if there are other authoritative guides on the
question. Id. at 613-14. Justice Kennedy concluded that the "Advisory
Committee's Note, the common law of the hearsay exception for statements
against interest, and the general presumption that Congress does not enact
statutes that have almost no effect" all demonstrate that Rule 804(b)(3) allows
the admission of some collateral statements. Id. at 614.
30. Id. at 600-01.
31. Id. at 598. The accomplice, Reginald Harris, made statements to a DEA
Agent that inculpated both Harris and Williamson. Id. at 597. At trial,
Harris refused to testify and the district court allowed the agent to testify as
to what Harris told him. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify
the scope of the statement against penal interest exception. Id. at 596.
32. Id. at 599.
33. Id. Justice O'Connor noted that "[o]ne of the most effective ways to lie
is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly
persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature." Id. at 599-600.
34. Id. at 599.
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the accomplice's confession were truly self-inculpatory. 35 As a
result of the Court's disposition, the Court did not reach the merits
36
of Confrontation Clause issue.
The Williamson Court also chose not to decide other questions
involving Rule 804(b)(3). First, the Court opted not to decide the
question of whether the statement against interest exception was
firmly rooted.3 7 The Court also chose not resolve the circuit split
regarding the corroboration requirement 38 when evaluating
statements that inculpate the accused. 39 The decision by the
Court in Williamson to leave these questions open prolonged the
disagreement among the circuit courts as to how the rule should
40
be applied.

35. Id. at 604. The inquiry is fact-intensive and requires a "careful
examination of all the circumstances surrounding the criminal activity"
involved in each particular case. Id.
36. "[W]e need not address Williamson's claim that the statements were
also made inadmissible by the Confrontation Clause ....
Id. at 605.
37. "[W]e need not decide whether the hearsay exception for declarations
against interest is 'firmly rooted' for Confrontation Clause purposes." Id.
At the time Williamson was decided several, circuit courts had addressed the
question of whether the exception is "firmly rooted." Compare United States
v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that the exception is firmly
rooted), with United States v. Flores, 985 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating
that the exception for statements against penal interest not firmly rooted),
and Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d 421, 428 (8th Cir. 1982) (custodial statements
implicating a third party do not fall within firmly rooted exception). The
Flores court concluded that the exception for declarations against penal
interest is not firmly rooted because of its controversial history and because
the Supreme Court indicated that statements against penal interest which
also inculpate a third party are often suspect. 985 F.2d at 777-80. See
generally supra note 21 (discussing the Supreme Court cases which find
confessions by accomplices and codefendants to be unreliable absent the
opportunity to cross-examine).
38. See supra note 15 (citing cases which require corroboration); supra note
16 (citing those cases which do not require corroboration).
39. 'We also need not decide, whether, as some Courts of Appeals have
held, the second sentence of Rule 804(b)(3)... also requires that statements
inculpating the accused be supported by corroborating circumstances."
Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605; see also John J. Capowski, Statements Against
Interest, Reliability, and the Confrontation Clause, 28 SETON HALL L. REV.
471, 509 (1997) (discussing the failure of the Court to address this issue).
40. Capowski, supra note 39, at 509. Capowski points out that "[d]ue
process and equal protection principles argue strongly for symmetrical
application of the corroboration requirement, but such a reading is contrary to
the plain meaning of the rule." Id. The decision by the Williamson Court to
balk at the opportunity to decide this issue "has left courts and practitioners to
define their own solutions." Id.
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D. The Court's Confrontation Clause JurisprudencePostWilliamson
1.

The Firmly Rooted Question

In Lilly v. Virginia,41 a plurality of the Court held that the
42
statements against interest exception is not firmly rooted.
Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens outlined three principal
situations where statements against penal interest are offered into
evidence. 43 The first category consists of voluntary admissions
against the declarant. 44
The second category consists of
statements of an unavailable declarant confessing to the
commission of a crime offered by the defendant to support a claim
41. 527 U.S. 116 (1999). In Lilly, the defendant was convicted of murder
after the state introduced his accomplice's tape-recorded confession under the
statements against penal interest exception. Id. at 122. The Supreme Court
of Virginia upheld the admission on the grounds that the exception is firmly
rooted under the state's hearsay law. Id.
42. The Court made clear that "accomplices' confessions that inculpate a
criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay
rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence." Id. at 134. Justice Stevens supported this conclusion by
asserting that the holdings in Bruton, Cruz v. New York, Gray v. Maryland,
and Lee v. Illinois, (citations omitted) "were all premised, explicitly or
implicitly, on the principle that accomplice confessions that inculpate a
criminal defendant are not per se admissible (and thus necessarily fall outside
a firmly rooted hearsay exception), no matter how much those statements also
incriminate the accomplice." Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134 n.5.
Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in
holding the statement against interest exception is not firmly rooted. Id. at
119. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas both concurred in part and concurred
in the judgment, though neither concurring opinion explicitly disagreed with
the plurality's conclusion that the exception is not firmly rooted. Id. at 143-44.
However, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
saw "no reason to foreclose the possibility that ...

statements ...

that

inculpate a codefendant may fall under a firmly rooted hearsay exception." Id.
at 147.
Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion to discuss the
problems with the test enunciated in Roberts. Id. at 140; see also White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (suggesting that the Court's
"Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has evolved in a manner that is perhaps
inconsistent with the text and history of the Clause itself.").
Justice Breyer noted how the current hearsay-based Confrontation Clause test
is arguably too narrow and too broad. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 141-42. However,
since the statements at issue in Lilly violated the Clause regardless, there was
no need to reexamine the link between the Confrontation Clause and the
hearsay rule. Id. at 142. Although Justice Breyer did not argue that the
Court should reevaluate the Roberts test, he did allude to the idea that he
would 'leave the question open for another day." Id. at 143; see also Crawford,
541 U.S. at 68 (overruling the Roberts test).
43. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 127.
44. Id. Statements in the first category do not violate the Confrontation
Clause and are routinely admitted. Id.
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that the declarant actually committed the crime. 45 The third
category consists of statements offered by the prosecution to
46
establish the guilt of the declarant's accomplice.
Statements in the third category, the type at issue in Lilly,
were found to be presumptively unreliable and thus fall outside a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. 47
The Court found the
statements in Lilly did not satisfy both prongs of the Roberts test
and remanded the case to determine if the Confrontation Clause
48
violation was harmless error.
2.

The Court Rethinks the Roberts Approach

In Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court
overruled Roberts to the extent that it governs testimonial
statements. 49 In Crawford, Sylvia Crawford made statements to
police officers during an interrogation at the station which
inculpated herself and her husband Michael in the stabbing of
Kenneth Lee. 50
The court admitted Sylvia's tape recorded
confession at trial after Michael invoked the spousal privilege to
keep his wife from testifying. 51 Michael was convicted and
45. Id. at 129-30; see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973)
(establishing that statements in the second category should be routinely
admitted because they are exculpatory and implicate the defendant's right to
conduct a meaningful defense).
46. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 130. The plurality found that the third category
encompasses statements that are inherently unreliable. Id.
47. Id. at 134. Justice Stevens asserted that the Court has "spoken with
one voice in declaring presumptively unreliable accomplices' confessions that
incriminate defendants." Id. at 131. The plurality's reasoning is based on the
Court's Bruton line of cases which illustrate the common principle that "when
one person accuses another of a crime under circumstances in which the
declarant stands to gain by inculpating another, the accusation is
presumptively suspect and must be subjected to the scrutiny of crossexamination." Id. at 132.
Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the "plurality's blanket ban on the
government's use of accomplice statements that incriminate a defendant...."
Id. at 147.
The plurality's response to this criticism was that the
Confrontation Clause does not place a per se ban on the government using
accomplice confessions at trial; rather it simply means the Government must

satisfy the second prong of the Roberts test. Id. at 134.
48. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 139-40.

49. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. The Court held that in order to admit a
testimonial hearsay statement, the Confrontation Clause requires the
declarant be unavailable and that there was a prior opportunity to crossexamine the declarant. Id. With regard to nontestimonial hearsay, the Court
acknowledges that Roberts may be used. Id.

50. Id. at 39-40. The prosecution charged the defendant with attempted
murder and assault. Id. at 40. Michael claimed self-defense at trial. Id.
Sylvia's statements were against her interest because they implicated her as
an accomplice. Id. at 39-40. Her statements also inculpated Michael because

they indicated that Lee did not have a weapon when Michael stabbed him. Id.
51. Id. Washington's marital privilege generally bars a spouse from
testifying without the other spouse's consent. Id. However, the privilege does
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appealed arguing that the State violated his Sixth Amendment
52
right to confront the witnesses against him.
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia looked to the history of
the Confrontation Clause to support two inferences about the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment. 53 First, the "principal evil at
which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the ... use of ex
parte examinations as evidence against the accused." 54 Second,
the "[firamers would not have allowed the admission of testimonial
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination." 55 Therefore, the Court held
that a testimonial statement could not be admitted unless the
declarant was unavailable and the defendant had a prior
56
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
not extend to a spouse's out-of-court statements admissible under a hearsay
exception. Id. The court allowed the tape to be played and admitted it into
evidence under the State's declaration against interest exception. Id.
52. Id. at 40.
53. Id. at 42-54.
54. Id. at 50. As Scalia explained, this was the "civil-law mode of criminal
procedure .. " Id.
55. Id. at 53-54. The Court's interpretation of historical sources led them to
conclude that a prior opportunity to cross-examine is a "necessary" condition
for admissibility of testimonial statements. Id. at 55. Justice Scalia further
supported this conclusions by pointing out that the results in the Court's prior
decisions were consistent with these propositions. Id. at 57. However, the
Court's rationales for deciding previous cases were not faithful to the original
meaning of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 60. Therefore, the Court
overruled the Roberts framework to the extent that it governs testimonial
statements. Id. at 68.
56. Id. The Court chose to leave for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of "testimonial." Id. The Court did note, however,
that a formal statement to a government officer qualifies as testimonial, while
a casual remark to an acquaintance is nontestimonial. Id. at 51. Additionally,
Justice Scalia concluded that whatever else the term "testimonial" covers, it
applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing and to
statements made before a grand jury, at a former trial, or during police
interrogations. Id. at 68.
In his concurring opinion, joined by Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice
Rehnquist opposed overruling Roberts. Id. at 69. One of his concerns was that
the Court's refusal to define what "testimonial" means will undoubtedly cause
confusion and uncertainty for "thousands of federal prosecutors and tens of
thousands of state prosecutors" who need answers to specific kinds of
testimony covered by the new rule. Id. at 75.
Justice Scalia responded to this particular concern by saying that the
interim uncertainty "can hardly be any worse than the status quo." Id. at 68.
Thus, while acknowledging that courts and practitioners will have difficulty
determining what is testimonial at least for the time being, Scalia pointed out
that "the Roberts test is inherently, and therefore permanently,
unpredictable." Id.
Recently, the consolidated case of Davis v. Washington, did not permit
the Court to indulge in the luxury of indecision in determining what the Court
meant by "testimonial." 547 U.S. 813 (2006). Specifically, the Court had to
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The Court found that Sylvia's statements were testimonial
and that she was unavailable, but Michael never had an
opportunity to cross examine her. Accordingly, the Court reversed
the Washington State Supreme Court's decision and remanded the
57
case.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The CorroborationRequirement
1. Congress Drafts the Rule, But Leaves the Rest Up to the Courts
In 1975, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence debated
placing a provision which would codify the Supreme Court's then
current interpretation of the Confrontation Clause espoused in
decide what is meant by "police interrogations." Id. at 823. In Davis, the
issue was whether an interrogation during the course of a 911 call produced
testimonial statements. Id. Writing for the Court once again, Justice Scalia
elaborated on Crawford's placement of police interrogations in the class of
testimonial hearsay. Id. at 826. Scalia explained that interrogations solely
directed at establishing the facts of a past crime in order to provide evidence to
convict or identify the perpetrator was what the Court had in mind in
Crawford. Id. In contrast to this, Justice Scalia wrote, a 911 call is ordinarily
not designed primarily to establish or prove some past fact. Id. at 827.
Instead, 911 calls describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.
Id.
The Davis Court concluded that statements are nontestimonial when
made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. Id. at 822. Therefore, the Court
found the statements made during the 911 call to be nontestimonial and thus
properly admitted. Id. at 828.
Along with Davis, the Court granted certiorari to the Indiana Supreme
Court in Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind.2005). Davis, 547 U.S. at
819. In Hammon, officers responded to a domestic disturbance between Amy
and Hershel Hammon. Id. The officers interrogated Amy outside the
presence of her husband and instructed Amy to fill out a battery affidavit. Id.
at 820. At Hershel's trial for domestic battery and a probation violation, Amy
refused to testify. Id. The officer who took Amy's statement testified, over
defense counsel's objection, to what Amy said and authenticated her affidavit.
Id.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Indiana Supreme
Court and remanded the case after concluding that all of Amy's statements
were testimonial. Id. at 834. The Court likened Amy's statements to Sylvia's
statements in Crawford. Id. at 829. In both cases, there was no emergency in
progress and the primary purpose of the interrogations was to investigate
"what happened" (a past fact); rather than "what was happening" (as in
Davis). Id. Therefore, the Court held that statements are "testimonial when
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Id. at
822.
57. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
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Bruton v. United States.58 The Court in Bruton held that the
admission of an extrajudicial hearsay statement of one
codefendant inculpating a second codefendant violated the
Confrontation Clause.5 9 The legislative history explains why this
provision was never added to the rule. It explained, as follows:
The committee decided to delete this provision because the basic
approach of the rules is to avoid codifying, or attempting to codify,
Fifth
as the
principles, such
evidentiary
constitutional
Amendment's right against self-incrimination and the Sixth
Amendment's right of confrontation. Codification of a constitutional
principle is unnecessary and, where the principle is under
60
development, often unwise.

Thus, while specifically addressing exculpatory statements,
the draftsmen of the new rules left the task of delineating
prerequisites to the admissibility of inculpatory against-interest
hearsay to the courts.

2. The Lower Federal Courts Have Divided on the Issue
a.

The Fifth Circuit's Pre-RobertsAnalysis

The first case to fully confront the question of whether the
corroboration requirement for exculpatory statements extends to
inculpatory declarations was United States v. Alvarez.6 1 In
Alvarez, the court examined the Supreme Court's Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence in order to determine the requirements
which were omitted by the drafters. The Fifth Circuit concluded in
Alvarez, according to the reasoning of Dutton v. Evans,62 that the
central feature of Confrontation Clause analysis is whether
The court held that the
inculpatory hearsay is reliable. 63
58. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 7068 (1974) (Conf. Rep.).
59. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 132.
60. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 7068.
61. 584 F.2d 694, 700-01 (5th Cir. 1978). The court traced the legislative
history of the exception to determine the appropriate standard for inculpatory
statements. Id.
62. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
63. Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 700-01. In Dutton v. Evans, an accomplice
(Williams) made a statement to his cellmate (Shaw) which inculpated the
accused (Evans). 400 U.S. at 77-78. The testimony of Shaw relating to what
Williams had told him was admitted. Id. at 78. Evans argued that his murder
conviction should be set aside because of the admission of Shaw's testimony.
Id. at 79. The Court rejected the defendant's argument because the
circumstances provided several indicia of reliability surrounding the
statement. Id. at 89.
In Dutton, the Court also reiterated its stance on the relationship
between the Clause and hearsay. The Court stated:
[T]he decisions of this Court make it clear that the mission of the
Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy
of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring that the
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admissibility of inculpatory declarations against interest requires
corroborating
circumstances
that
clearly
indicate
the
64
trustworthiness of the statement.
The Alvarez court reasoned that requiring corroboration for
both exculpatory and inculpatory statements satisfied the Court's
directive in Dutton v. Evans, avoiding the "constitutional
difficulties that Congress acknowledged but deferred to the
judiciary for resolution." 65 Moreover, the court reasoned that a
unitary standard for both types of statements offers the most
workable basis for applying the rule. 66
b.

The Federal Courts' Response to Alvarez

The majority of the circuits chose to follow Alvarez, explicitly
or implicitly.67 In United States v. Garcia,68 a case decided after
Roberts, the Seventh Circuit adopted the test enunciated in
Alvarez. 69 The Garcia court focused on the requirements of
804(b)(3) separately from the Confrontation Clause issue. 70 The
court found corroborating circumstances which indicated that the
trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior
statement.
Id.
The Alvarez court determined that Dutton required that the statements
must be reliable to be properly admitted. Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701. When
Ohio v. Roberts was decided in 1980, the mandate of reliability was not
significantly altered, but more clearly defined by the Court. See Roberts, 448
U.S. at 66 (requiring that hearsay statements must bear adequate "indicia of
reliability'). Thus, courts continued to apply the Alvarez holding in the postRoberts era because it comported with the Court's Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. See United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1421 (7th Cir.
1990) (deciding that the corroborating circumstances requirement satisfies the
second part of the Roberts test).
64. Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1420 (explicitly deciding to follow Alvarez);
Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1170 (following Alvarez implicitly and explaining that
"this Circuit requires corroborating circumstances even when the statement is
offered... to inculpate the accused."); see also supra note 15 (citing cases that
follow the Alvarez approach explicitly or implicitly).
Notably, the Ninth Circuit has been confronted with this issue several
times and has chosen each time to leave the question undecided. See United
States v. Layton, 720 F.2d 548, 559 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that "[w]e need not
reach the question here because we conclude that the third, as well as the first
two requirements [of Rule 804(b)(3)] have been met"); United States v.
Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 531 (9th Cir. 1991) (reaching the same result by
concluding that "[w]e likewise need not decide the question here, because even
assuming the corroborating circumstances requirement applies, we find that it
is met in this case").
68. 897 F.2d 1413 (7th Cir. 1990).
69. Garcia,897 F.2d at 1420 (stating that "[w]e believe this is a useful test
to be used in such an analysis and we adopt it here").
70. Id. at 1420-21.
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In regards to the
statements at issue were trustworthy. 71
defendant's Sixth Amendment claim, the court applied the second
part of the Roberts test and stated:
[W]e have previously determined that the statements were properly
admitted as statements against interest under Rule 804(b)(3). As
such, we concluded that the statements were supported by sufficient
corroborating evidence. That evidence also satisfies72 the required
indicia of reliability for confrontation clause purposes.

Therefore, the court applied the unitary standard as well as
the second prong of the Roberts test in upholding the admission of
the inculpatory statements at trial. 73 While the Seventh Circuit's
approach appears to side-step the firmly rooted question by
directly moving to the second prong, the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. York 74 pointed out that implicit in Garcia is the premise
75
that the exception is firmly rooted.
71. Id. at 1420.
72. Id. at 1421. After Garcia, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. York
held that for an inculpatory statement "[t]o be admissible under rule
804(b)(3)... the inculpatory portion of a statement against interest must be
sufficiently reliable to satisfy the confrontation clause." 933 F.2d 1343, 1361
(7th Cir. 1991). In regards to application of the unitary standard and the
second part of the Roberts test, the court said that "[t]here seems little reason
to treat the requirement of reliability differently in each context. Such an
approach would be needlessly complex, requiring two bodies of case law where
one will do." Id.
In York, the statement at issue involved an accomplice's statement to
two associates. Id. at 1360. The court found the declarations against penal
interest exception to be firmly rooted. Id. at 1363. The court admitted the
statement under 804(b)(3) after finding corroborating circumstances that
clearly indicated the trustworthiness of statement, in accordance with the
Garcia standard, and holding there was no Confrontation Clause violation. Id.
at 1364.
The Seventh Circuit, therefore, follows the rule that "where testimony
passes the 804(b)(3) test it normally will pass Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause analysis as well." United States v. Sims, 879 F. Supp. 828, 831 (N.D.
Ill. 1995). This approach, of course, would not comply with the demands of
Crawford. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (holding that "[w]here testimonial
evidence is at issue... the Sixth Amendment demands ... unavailability and
a prior opportunity for cross-examination.").
Under Crawford, the corroborating circumstances test becomes
irrelevant for Confrontation Clause purposes because the crucial inquiry is
If the statement is
Id.
whether the statement is "testimonial."
nontestimonial, the Sixth Amendment problem is avoided. Id. It remains
unclear, however, if the second part of the Roberts test or the corroborating
circumstances requirement should be applied to nontestimonial statements
(against penal interest) that inculpate the defendant. See id. (allowing
flexibility in hearsay law for nontestimonial statements).
73. Garcia,897 F.2d at 1420-21.
74. 933 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1991).
75. Id. at 1363. The court in York explained:
In Garcia we... rejected a claim that admission of an inculpatory
hearsay statement under rule 804(b)(3) violated the defendant's sixth
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c. The First Part of the Roberts Test: Firmly Rooted Hearsay
Exception
In 1986, the Court provided some guidance on the question of
whether the statement against interest exception was firmly
rooted in Lee v. Illinois.76 In Lee, a majority of the Court held that
confessions by an accomplice inculpating the accused are
presumptively unreliable.7 7 This presumption, however, could be
overcome if the statement bears "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."7 8 In Lilly, Justice Stevens relied on the holding
in Lee in determining that the statement against penal interest
79
exception is not firmly rooted.
After Lilly, even though only a plurality of the Court found
the exception not to be firmly rooted, the federal courts chose not
to diverge from this conclusion.8 0 As a result, courts consistently
amendment right to confront witnesses against him. While we did not
expressly state that the statement against penal interest exception to
the hearsay rule is "firmly rooted," we observed that the reliability of the
inculpatory statement at issue in that case had been adequately
established for purposes of the evidentiary rule, thereby satisfying the
requirements of the confrontation clause as well. Our holding in Garcia
was tantamount to saying that the exception is well-rooted within the
meaning of Roberts... and we affirm that view today.
Id.
76. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
77. Lee, 476 U.S. at 539. In Lee, two defendants (Lee and Thomas) were
tried jointly in bench trial. Id. at 531. While neither defendant testified at
trial, the trial judge expressly relied on Thomas' confession to the police as
substantive evidence against Lee. Id.
Lee argued that the trial judge's
reliance on Thomas's statement violated her Sixth Amendment right to
confront the witnesses against her. Id.
The Court held that a codefendant's confession inculpating the accused is
inherently unreliable and thus, convictions supported by such evidence violate
the constitutional right of confrontation. Id. at 546.
78. Id. at 543.
79. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134.
80. See United States v. Shea, 211 F.3d 658, 669 (1st Cir. 2000)
(distinguishing Lilly, but not disagreeing with the plurality's conclusion that
the exception is not firmly rooted); United States v. Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265,
269 (2nd Cir. 2000) (declining to decide whether the declaration against
interest exception is firmly rooted); United States v. Moses, 148 F.3d 277, 281
(3d Cir. 1998) (declining to address the issue before Lilly was decided); United
States v. Taylor, No. 98-4517, No. 98-4518, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19239, at
*30 (4th Cir. August 16, 1999) (deciding not to answer the question); United
States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 2004) (following Lilly and prior
precedent); Vincent v. Seabold, 226 F.3d 681, 688 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that
"both Williamson and Lilly instruct that... we must evaluate the indicia of
reliability associated with each individual remark or declaration"); United
States v. Robbins, 197 F.3d 829, 839 (7th Cir. 1999) (following Lilly); United
States v. Chapman, 345 F.3d 630, 634-35 (8th Cir. 2003) (accepting that Lilly
controls the admissibility of statements in the instant case); Forn v. Hornung,
343 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that "[a]lthough Lilly is a plurality
decision, we have consistently viewed the case as binding precedent"); United
States v. Gomez, 191 F.3d 1214, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
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applied the second prong of the Roberts reliability test to
determine if the admission of a statement against interest, which
inculpated the accused, was proper under the Confrontation
Clause. 81 Since Crawford overruled Roberts, the application of the
reliability test has changed.
B. Crawford Reshapes the Mode of Analysis
1.

Testimonial Statements and the Confrontation Clause

In the wake of Crawford, the test for admitting statements
against interest which inculpate the accused significantly changed.
The starting point for Confrontation Clause analysis, as in all
accused, is to first
hearsay statements admitted against the
82
determine if the statement is testimonial.
If the declarant is unavailable and the statement is
testimonial, then it is admissible if there was a prior opportunity
to cross-examine.8 3 However, if there was no prior opportunity to
cross-examine, then the statement is inadmissible because the
Sixth Amendment demands actual confrontation.8 4 The test for
nontestimonial statements, however, is not as clear.
2. Nontestimonial Statements and the Confrontation Clause
Inculpatory statements that are nontestimonial do not have
the same Confrontation Clause implications as testimonial
statements. Justice Scalia explained in Crawford that "[w]here
nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the
Framers's design to afford the States flexibility in their
development of hearsay law - as does Roberts, and as would an
approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation
85
Clause scrutiny altogether."
As a result, states have more leeway in developing their own
exception is not firmly rooted under Lee, Lilly, Williamson, and Tenth Circuit
precedent); United States v. Francois, 295 F. Supp. 2d 60, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(choosing not to tackle the firmly rooted question and deciding instead to focus
on whether 'accused's statement bears sufficient indicia of reliability to merit

its admissibility).
81. See United States v. McCleskey, 228 F.3d 640, 644 (6th Cir. 2000)
(stating that "Confrontation Clause jurisprudence does not permit the
introduction of hearsay declarations uttered by accomplices in law
enforcement custody that inculpate a defendant, absent further 'particularized
guarantees' of the declaration's trustworthiness.").
82. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (stating that the Sixth Amendment
demands that admission of testimonial evidence requires unavailability and
prior opportunity to cross-examine).

83. Id.
84. See id. at 69 (stating that "the only indicium of reliability sufficient to
satisfy the constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually
prescribes: confrontation.").

85. Id. at 68.
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rules of evidence their own rules for nontestimonial statements.8 6
They may choose to apply Roberts or to exempt the statements
from any sort of Confrontation Clause analysis.8 7 The federal
courts have applied the Roberts reliability test when analyzing
nontestimonial statements.88
a.

Applying Roberts to Nontestimonial Statements Post-Crawford

Because there is ample authority indicating that the
statement against interest exception is not firmly rooted, the
federal courts tend to rely on the second prong of the Roberts test
for nontestimonial statements.8 9 Courts look for particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness in order to determine if the
statement is reliable. 90
As noted by the court in Garcia, this test is remarkably
similar to the corroborating
circumstances
requirement
804(b)(3). 91 Thus, nontestimonial inculpatory statements receive
the same treatment under either the second part of the Roberts
test or the application of the unitary standard enunciated in
Alvarez.
Which is the correct approach, however, is an
92
unanswered question.
b. The Federal Courts Application of Roberts to Nontestimonial
Statements
Today, the federal courts reject the option to exempt
statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether. 93
Instead, the courts apply the Roberts test and guide their decisions
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Hammond v. United States, No. 97-CF-624, No. 97-CF-791, 2005
D.C. App. LEXIS 414, at *81 (D.C. Cir. August 11, 2005) (stating that
"Crawford did not alter the application of Roberts to non-testimonial
statements; therefore, we accept the continued viability of Roberts").
89. See Lee, 476 U.S. at 539 (holding that accomplice confessions
inculpating the accused are presumptively unreliable); Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134
(holding that a confession by an accomplice that inculpates a criminal
defendant is not within a firmly rooted exception); see also supra note 80
(citing federal circuit court cases that either follow Lilly or decline to decide
the question).
90. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (holding that if the exception is not firmly
rooted, then "the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.").
91. See Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1420-21 (explaining that the corroboration
requirement satisfies the second part of the Roberts test).
92. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (deferring to the states and inferior
federal courts to decide the proper level of scrutiny to analyze nontestimonial
statements).
93. See United States v. Taylor, 328 F. Supp. 2d 915, 920 (N.D. Ind. 2004)
(applying Roberts to nontestimonial statements); United States v. Savoca, 335
F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (giving states room to construct their own
hearsay law when dealing with nontestimonial statements).
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by precedent prior to Crawford.94 While courts do not discuss the
unitary standard, by applying the second part of the Roberts test,
95
courts implicitly reject its application.
In United States v. Taylor,96 the government sought to admit
an inculpatory statement made by the defendant to his accomplice
under 804(b)(3).97
The district court did not state that the
statement was nontestimonial; however, the court applied the
second part of the Roberts test. 98 Following the Seventh Circuit,
the court found "that [the defendant's] statement against penal
interest to [his accomplice] is inherently trustworthy because the
circumstances surrounding the statement afford it a particularized
guarantee of trustworthiness."99
Under Garcia, it is debatable whether the court should have
applied the corroborating circumstances requirement. The fact
that the court did not thoroughly discuss whether the statement
was testimonial did not help clarify the issue. The court, however,
applied Roberts for purposes of satisfying the Confrontation
Clause. 100 In doing so, the court implicitly rejected the option of
exempting the statements from Confrontation Clause analysis.101
This also has the implied effect of rejecting the unitary standard
approach.102
Similarly, in United States v. Savoca,10 3 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York confronted
the question of what the proper analysis should be for
94. Savoca, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 393.
95. This principle is demonstrated in Savoca, where the court does not
mention the corroboration requirement and uses the second part of the
Roberts test, implicitly indicating that the unitary standard is rejected
because both tests serve essentially the same purpose. Id.; see also Garcia,
897 F.2d at 1420-21 (determining that the unitary standard satisfies the
second part of the Roberts test for confrontation clause purposes); Williamson,
512 U.S. at 605 (noting that "the very fact that a statement is genuinely selfinculpatory-which our reading of Rule 804(b)(3) requires-is itself one of the
'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' that makes a statement
admissible under the Confrontation Clause.").
96. 328 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. Ind. 2004).
97. Id. at 919.
98. Id. at 923. The court did state that they would utilize the "framework
of Roberts, Lilly, and Crawford." Id. The court, however, did not expressly
indicate that the statement was nontestimonial; instead, the court proceeded
directly to the Roberts test. Id.
99. Id. at 926.
100. Id. at 923. The court stated that "the statement must also survive
analysis under the Confrontation Clause." Id. The court then applied the
Roberts test. Id.
101. See supra note 92 (noting that Crawford deferred to the lower courts as
to whether to exempt nontestimonial statements from Confrontation Clause
scrutiny).
102. See Taylor, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 923 (proceeding directly to the Roberts
test impliedly rejects the unitary standard).
103. 335 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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nontestimonial inculpatory hearsay statements offered by the
government under 804(b)(3). 10 4 The court, following Crawford,
categorized the defendant's statements as nontestimonial because
the defendant made the statements to an acquaintance who had
no connection to any law enforcement official or proceeding;
further the statements were not formal statements to a
10 5
government official.
As a result, the court reasoned that it could either follow the
Roberts inquiry or exempt the statements from Confrontation
Clause analysis. 10 6 The court decided to perform an analysis
consistent with the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause
10 7
jurisprudence and Second Circuit case law prior to Crawford.
The court applied the second prong of the Roberts test and rejected
the option to exempt the statements from constitutional
scrutiny. 108
The court admitted the statements under 804(b)(3) because
of
guarantees
particularized
had
sufficient
they
trustworthiness. 09 In its analysis, however, the court did not
acknowledge that the Second Circuit requires corroborating
circumstances when the statement is offered, under 804(b)(3), to
Because the court analyzed the
inculpate the accused. 110
statements under Roberts in order to comport with the
Confrontation Clause, the court, as in Taylor, implicitly rejected
the unitary standard."1
IV. PROPOSAL
A.

The Problem:How Should a Court Analyze Nontestimonial
Inculpatory Statements Against PenalInterest?

Once a court determines that an inculpatory hearsay
statement is nontestimonial and that it falls under the 804(b)(3)
104. Id. at 393.
105. Id. at 392.
106. Id. at 393.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 394 (noting that "[a]lthough the Second Circuit has not yet
opined as to whether hearsay statements admissible under Rule 804(b)(3)...

fall within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Second Circuit
has relied on the second category and discussed what constitutes
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."). The court then applied the
second part of the Roberts test and decided not to exempt the statements from

constitutional scrutiny altogether. Id.
109. Id. at 400.
110. See Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1170 (explaining that the Second Circuit
requires corroborating circumstances when the statement is offered to
inculpate the accused).
111. See supra note 95 (explaining that using the Roberts test without
consideration of the corroboration requirement implies a rejection of the
unitary standard).
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exception, the court has several options from which to choose to
112
complete its analysis.
1. Three Possible Modes of Analysis
First, a court can simply decide to exempt the statement from
any Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether." 3 Second, the court
may choose to apply the unitary standard by requiring
corroborating
circumstances
which
clearly indicate
the
trustworthiness of the statement. 1 4 Finally, the court could
evaluate the statement under the Roberts test and examine the
5
statement for particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.1
a.

Exempting the Statements Altogether

In Crawford, the majority opinion explicitly allows state
courts and the lower courts the option of exempting
nontestimonial statements from any sort of Confrontation Clause
analysis. 1 6 As of yet, courts have not chosen to embrace this
option as the proper method.
If courts were to do this for statements admitted under
804(b)(3), then questions of due process and fairness would arise
from the disproportionate treatment given to exculpatory
statements offered by the accused. 1 7
This would, without
112. Theoretically, a state or federal court has more options than the three
possibilities discussed in this Comment. Crawford gave substantial deference
to the lower courts to determine the proper analysis for nontestimonial
statements.
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (allowing flexibility for
nontestimonial statements).
Whichever option is chosen by a court,
uniformity among the federal courts should certainly be a consideration. Since
this uniformity was never fully achieved with the unitary standard, it stands
to reason that the Roberts test is the only approach capable of achieving
consistent application in each jurisdiction.
113. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
114. Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701.
115. See Savoca, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (choosing to apply the Roberts test to
nontestimonial inculpatory statements sought to be admitted under 804(b)(3)).
Today, the question of whether the statement against penal interest exception
is firmly rooted should be considered closed. See supra note 80 (citing cases
that either follow Lilly or chose not to decide the issue and apply the second
part of the Roberts test). The Roberts test, therefore, is simply shorthand for
describing the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness standard
contained in the second part of the Roberts framework. While courts could
choose to analyze the firmly rooted question, it is more logical to move directly
to the second part of the test. Thus, this Comment argues that the
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness standard should always be
applied to nontestimonial inculpatory 804(b)(3) statements. See Daniel J.
Capra, Essay: Amending the Hearsay Exceptionfor DeclarationsAgainst Penal
Interest in the Wake of Crawford, 105 COLUM. L. REV 2409, 2446 (2005)

(arguing that the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness standard
should be applied to nontestimonial inculpatory statements).
116. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
117. See supra note 40 (explaining the argument that due process and equal
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question, undercut the reasoning of Alvarez and those courts that
have followed the rationale of the unitary standard. 118 While
exempting the statements would certainly be consistent with the
plain meaning of 804(b)(3), this option would no doubt lead to a
complex debate regarding the proper way to amend the rule.l 9
Surely, courts could apply an alternative scheme that would not
1 20
necessitate an act of Congress.
protection principles strongly argue for inculpatory statements to be held to a
similar standard as exculpatory statements).
118. The issue for the Alvarez court was how the reliability of inculpatory
statements should be analyzed. Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701. The court chose to
apply the exact same standard for inculpatory statements as Congress chose
to provide for exculpatory statements. Id. This indicates that the Alvarez
court, and the courts that follow this approach, believe that this is a fair way
of filling in the gaps of 804(b)(3).
119. See Capra, supra note 115, at 2444-45 (proposing that 804(b)(3) should
be amended). Capra suggests that the proposed amendment might look like
this:
(3) Statement against interest. - A statement which that was at the time
of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary
interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal
liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another,
that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have
made the statement unless believing it to be true. But in a criminal
case, a A [sic] statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless
under this subdivision in the following circumstances only:
(A) if offered to exculpate an accused, it is supported by corroborating
circumstances that clearly indicate the [sic] its trustworthiness, or of the
statement
(B) if offered to inculpate an accused, it is supported by particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness and is made other than in the course of
interrogation by one or more law enforcement officers.
Id. Capra thus endorses codifying Roberts and the constitutional principles of
Crawford into the rule. Id. Placing a provision in the rule that is designed to
comport with Crawford, however, contradicts the original intent of Congress to
avoid codifying constitutional principles. See S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 7068
(stating that "the basic approach of the [federal] rules is to avoid codifying, or
attempting to codify, constitutional evidentiary principles"). Moreover, Davis
indicates the term "testimonial" is an evolving concept. See Davis, 547 U.S. at
821-24 (explaining how the "primary purpose" test determines whether a
statement to law enforcement is testimonial). Capra's proposed amendment
would only apply the Roberts test to those statements "made other than in the
course of interrogation by one or more law enforcement officers." Capra, supra
note 115, at 2445. Under this rule, 911 calls would likely be considered
"testimonial." The Supreme Court, however, has recently declared that at
least some 911 calls are nontestimonial. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827. Therefore, it
may be more sensible to continue allowing courts to interpret the rule, as
Crawford and its progeny continue to develop Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence.
120. Congress determined when they first drafted 804(b)(3) to leave this
decision to the courts. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 7068. Additionally, Justice
Scalia deferred the decision on the proper mode of analysis for nontestimonial
hearsay to the States and lower courts. Thus, the courts should determine the
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b. Applying the Unitary Standard
One alternative mode of analysis is to require corroborating
circumstances for both exculpatory and inculpatory statements.
This would be a fair and logical approach to the problem for two
reasons. 121 First, the unitary standard has been widely accepted
by the federal appellate courts over the years.1 22 This indicates
that the Alvarez approach is sound in its reasoning and useful in
its application.123 Second, this approach is pragmatic because it
decreases confusion among judges and practitioners by
establishing a uniform requirement for all statements admitted
under 804(b)(3).124
This approach, however, is not the best solution to the
problem. 125 The case law endorsing and applying the unitary
standard is sporadic and inconsistent. 26 While the vast majority of
courts have accepted the unitary standard, 27 some jurisdictions
have either not decided the question or have never been presented

proper standard to evaluate nontestimonial inculpatory statements against
penal interest.
121. See Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701 (explaining why the unitary standard is a
sound approach).
122. See supra note 15 (citing cases that follow Alvarez explicitly or
implicitly).
123. See supra note 69 (noting that the Seventh Circuit in Garcia adopted
the "useful test" enunciated in Alvarez).
124. See Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701 (arguing that a uniform standard is the
best approach).
125. See Capra, supra note 115, at 2446 (arguing that the particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness standard should be applied and not the
corroborating circumstances requirement).
Capra explains that "[t]he
difference between the two standards is that 'corroborating circumstances'
requires or permits the use of independent corroborating evidence, whereas
the 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' requirement can be satisfied
only by reference to the circumstantial guarantees of reliability under which
the hearsay statement was made." Id. Therefore, the Roberts test focuses on
the reliability of the statement itself, as opposed to extrinsic evidence offered
to show the statement is trustworthy. Id.
Capra criticizes the unitary standard by explaining that:
[t]he problem with the corroborating circumstances requirement as
applied to statements offered by the prosecution is that it does not
satisfy the Roberts test ...

. This would not be an important point if

there were no constitutional limitations on nontestimonial hearsay after
Crawford... [t]herefore, it remains prudent to retain the 'particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness' test, so as to comport with constitutional
standards until the Supreme Court tells us otherwise.
Id. at 2446-47. Capra's endorsement of the Roberts test indicates that Roberts
is not only still applicable to nontestimonial hearsay, but is also the preferred
mode of analysis. Id.
126. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605 (acknowledging the circuit split on
whether the unitary standard should be applied).
127. See supra note 15 (citing the majority of circuits that apply the unitary
standard).
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the opportunity to do so. 1 2 8 Furthermore, because the case law is
limited and underdeveloped, relying on the unitary standard
would undoubtedly cause uncertainty in the lower courts as to
what particular circumstances corroborated a statement and
which did not. Moreover, courts today instinctively turn to the
129
Roberts test once a statement is found to be nontestimonial.
Indeed, as indicated in Taylor and Savoca, courts do not even
acknowledge the unitary standard as an option in analyzing
804(b)(3) statements.1 30 The unitary standard, therefore, is not a
viable and workable solution.
c.

Applying the Roberts Test

Since Crawford, lower courts have continually looked to the
Roberts test to analyze nontestimonial statements.1 31 Even though
the test was overruled, Justice Scalia acknowledged the continued
13 2
While
viability of Roberts in the majority opinion of Crawford.
Justice Saclia did not explicitly endorse using the test, he certainly
viewed Roberts as a better option than exemption or the unitary
133
standard.
B. The Solution: Requiring NontestimonialInculpatory
Statements Against Penal Interest to Have Particularized
Guaranteesof Trustworthiness
Courts should avoid the shortcomings of the other options by
applying the Roberts test. The Roberts test avoids the questions of
due process and fairness that would arise from exempting the
13 4
statements from any kind of constitutional scrutiny.
Additionally, "[the] 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness'
[standard] is well-defined in the case law and provides a solid
protection against the use of unreliable declarations against
128. See Williams, 989 F.2d at 1068 (pointing out that the Ninth Circuit has
repeatedly decided not to answer the question). The Fourth, Tenth, D.C., and
Federal Court of Appeals have not addressed whether the unitary standard is
the correct approach.
129. See Capra, supra note 115, at 2446 (explaining that since "Crawford
failed to implement the fatal blow to Roberts ... [the] lower courts ...

apply

the Roberts reliability test to nontestimonial hearsay.").
130. See Part III (discussing both Taylor and Savoca).
131. See Part III (demonstrating that Taylor and Savoca both applied
Roberts as if it were the default test for nontestimonial statements).
132. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
133. See supra note 125 (explaining why the Roberts test is superior to the
unitary standard and to an approach that does not inquire into the reliability
of nontestimonial statements).
134. The reliability of the Roberts test is superior to the unitary standard
and avoids the problem of a nontestimonial statement being admitted under
804(b)(3) without any inquiry into its reliability. See supra note 125 (arguing
the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness standard is preferred to the
corroborating circumstances requirement).
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interest in criminal cases."135
This permits judges and
practitioners to rely on a wide variety of precedent for guidance. 136
Furthermore, as indicated above, courts have almost a Pavlovian
response to follow the Roberts test after a statement is found to be
nontestimonial.
1. The Roberts Test Ensures Fairand Equal Treatment for
804(b)(3) Inculpatory Statements
The legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend
for the federal courts to evaluate exculpatory statements under a
higher standard than inculpatory statements. 137
Instead, it
deferred to the courts to determine the proper standard for
admitting inculpatory statements. 138 The Alvarez court was the
first of many courts to decide that inculpatory statements should
be given equal treatment in determining their reliability. 139
Exempting nontestimonial statements, while constitutionally
permissible,1 40 is unworkable because it treats exculpatory
41
statements different from those that inculpate the accused.
Even though the inculpatory statements are nontestimonial,
courts should not admit incriminating hearsay without some
inquiry into its reliability.1 42 The Roberts test provides a viable
143
mode of analysis to conduct this inquiry.
135. Capra, supra note 115, at 2449.
136. See Savoca, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (relying on "case law established by
the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit prior to the recent Crawford
decision" for nontestimonial statements against interest).
137. See S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 7068 (explaining that Congress chose to
leave the prerequisites for admitting inculpatory statements to the federal
courts).
138. Id.
139. See supra note 15 (listing decisions that follow Alvarez explicitly or
implicitly).
140. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (noting that it is constitutional for courts
to exempt nontestimonial statements from any Confrontation Clause
analysis).
141. See Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701 (explaining that the standard for
exculpatory statements should be the same for inculpatory statements).
142. See Capra, supra note 115, at 2412 (arguing that "even certain
constitutional applications of the existing rule can result in unreliable hearsay
being admitted against an accused."). Capra explains that nontestimonial
hearsay can be admitted under 804(b)(3) without any inquiry into the
reliability of the statement. Id. Under Crawford, admitting the statement
would also be constitutional. Id. Capra argues, therefore, that "rulemaking is
necessary to provide for evidentiary protections where the Constitution does
not apply." Id. Capra's proposed amendment, however, would be inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's decision in Davis. See supra note 119 (explaining
how the nontestimonial 911 call in Davis would be considered testimonial
under Capra's amendment). Therefore, the courts should determine which
mode of analysis to apply to nontestimonial inculpatory statements admitted
under 804(b)(3) against the accused.
143. See supra note 125 (explaining that the particularized guarantees of
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2. Abandoning the Unitary Standard
The Alvarez approach offers courts a uniform, symmetrical,
and fair method to analyze inculpatory statements. 144 The unitary
standard, however, is no longer necessary because Crawford's
testimonial framework properly protects the defendant from
Thus, with regard to
Confrontation Clause violations. 145
testimonial statements, Crawford answered the question left open
by Congress. 146 The standard for nontestimonial statements,
1 47
however, was left open for the lower courts to decide.
Courts should apply the Roberts test because the indicia of
reliability framework has been developed and expounded upon
since 1980, leaving behind an immense body of case law.1 48 The
unitary standard was not consistently followed 49 and the cases
applying this method do not compare to the sheer volume of cases
1 50
applying Roberts. The unitary standard should be abandoned.
3.

The Natural Tendency to Fallback to Roberts

Courts have a long history of relying on the Roberts test.
Roberts laid the foundation for the Court to develop a
comprehensive approach to analyzing the relationship between
hearsay and the Confrontation Clause for almost twenty-five
years. Over that period of time, the Court issued many opinions
which lower courts continually relied upon to determine the scope
of the confrontation rights of the accused.
It comes as no surprise that courts now have an instinctual
and immediate tendency to return to the Roberts test once they
determine that an 804(b)(3) statement is nontestimonial. Because
lower courts are very familiar with Roberts and its progeny, judges
trustworthiness standard is the most logical and practical mode of analysis to
examine nontestimonial statements after Crawford).
144. See supra note 15 (citing cases that follow Alvarez).
145. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (stating that the Confrontation Clause
requires actual confrontation in order to admit testimonial statements).
146. See id. at 68 (explaining the meaning of the Sixth Amendment and
what the Constitution specifically requires to admit a statement against the
accused). Thus, courts should answer the constitutional question, deferred by
the drafters, of what the Sixth Amendment requires to admit an 804(b)(3)
statement by following Crawford.

147. Id. Congress left for the courts to decide how to constitutionally admit
an inculpatory statement. Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701. The Supreme Court
answered this question for testimonial statements and then deferred to the

lower courts to decide the standard, if any, for nontestimonial statements.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
148. See Capra, supra note 115, at 2449 (noting that the case law applying
Roberts is "well defined").
149. See supra note 68 (citing Ninth Circuit cases that have consistently

refused to decide this issue).
150. See supra note 125 (arguing that the particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness standard is preferred to the unitary standard).
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tend to have little hesitation in applying the reliability test to
nontestimonial statements. Furthermore, a return to Roberts is
the logical choice because Crawford only overruled Roberts to the
extent that it governs testimonial statements. 51 Thus, courts
should continue to apply the Roberts test.
TV. CONCLUSION
While the debate over amending 804(b)(3) is likely to
continue, federal courts can avoid the uncertainty surrounding the
rule's proper application by utilizing the following approach.
First, courts should apply the plain meaning of the rule to
determine if an inculpatory statement comports with the explicit
requirements.
Second, courts should then determine if the
statement is testimonial. 152 If the statement is nontestimonial,
the court should eschew the corroborating circumstances test and
apply the Roberts test to determine the reliability of the
statement.
This approach is consistent with the rule itself, as well as the
Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
In
Crawford, the Court partially answered the question left open by
the drafters of the rule by providing a clear standard for admitting
testimonial inculpatory statements.
In doing so, the Court
delegated the responsibility for determining the proper standard
for nontestimonial inculpatory statements to lower federal courts.
Uniform application of the Roberts test by the federal
judiciary to nontestimonial statements against penal interest
avoids the fairness problems that have plagued the rule since its
inception. Moreover, the confusion surrounding the corroborating
circumstances test is eliminated by the application of the more
practical and familiar Roberts test. The adoption of this approach
by federal courts also disposes of the need to redraft or amend the
rule. Accordingly, the Roberts test provides the appropriate
framework for dealing with nontestimonial statements against
penal interest.

151. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Recently, in Whorton v. Bockting, the Court
unanimously ruled that Crawford "announced a 'new rule' of criminal
procedure" and should not be applied retroactively. Whorton, 127 S. Ct. 1173,
1184 (2007). Thus, Roberts and its progeny continues to apply, and those
defendants may not assert that their right to confrontation was violated under
Crawford.
152. If the statement is testimonial, then Crawford requires a prior
opportunity to cross-examine. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. If there was no prior
opportunity to cross-examine, the statement is inadmissible. Id.

